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As Justice Douglas emphasized in his dissent, the practical
87
effect of Davis may be cancel section 802 (b) (1) from the Code.
Nevertheless, the decision ends the confusion surrounding the
lower courts' application of the "flexible net effect" test under
which a legitimate business purpose might make a stock redemption not "essentially equivalent to a dividend." As the result of this
decision there are no doubts remaining as to the application of
section 318 to section 302 (b) (1). On the other hand, as previously mentioned, the decision does not deal with the possibility of
exceptions to section 318, such as family hostility.38
Robert R. Fredeking II
S7

88

United States v. Davis, 90 S. Ct. 1041, 1048 (1970).
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(Commerce

Clearing House 1970).

Insurance-Pyramided Recovery
Under Multiple Uninsured
Motorist Provisions
As a result of a collision between an automobile, not covered
by an uninsured motorist provision, and an uninsured vehicle,
Mark Arminski, young suffered injuries in excess of $20,000. An
action for bodily injuries was instituted in Mark's behalf by his
father, Dr. Thomas Arminski, to whom the defendant insurance
company had issued a policy covering two cars and providing for
family protection and uninsured motorist coverage. Dr. Arminski
had paid two separate premiums for the uninsured motorist coverage. The defendant's liability for bodily injuries under the family protection clause was limited to $10,000 for each person and
$20,000 for each accident.
The trial court found that defendant insurer, because it
charged two separate premiums for its coverage, was liable for
$20,000 notwithstanding the limitation of the family protection
clause. On appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals, adopting a
literal reading of the policy, held: reversed and remanded for
judgment to be entered in favor of defendant. Arminski v. United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 178 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. Ct. App.

1970).
The trial court distinguished the present case from the only
Michigan decision on point, Horr v. Detroit Automobile Inter.
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Insurance Exchange,1 which involved policies from two different
companies having the same limitation on liability for bodily injuries as the Arminski policy. In the Horr case recovery against
the two companies involved was limited to $10,000 and each company was held liable ratably for its share. Since the Horr case involved two different insurers, the trial court felt that it was only
equitable to make them ratably responsible. The Arminski case
involved a single insurer receiving two separate premiums for the
coverage provided. For that reason the trial court concluded that
the limitation should not apply.
Although the Michigan trial court was reversed, many state
courts have agreed with its liberal interpretation where multiple
premiums are paid, despite liability-limiting provisions. In Bryant
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,2 a Virginia case, the

insured (Bryant) had a judgment for $85,000 against an uninsured
motorist and had collected $10,059 under the uninsured motorist
provision of his father's policy. He then attempted to recover the
unpaid part of the judgment within the limits of his own policy, in
spite of the policy's provision that the insurer undertook to pay
only such sums as exceeded any other similar insurance available
to him.3 In finding such a liability-limiting provision inconsistent
with Virginia substantive law, the court relied upon the Virginia
statute dealing with liability insurance on motor vehicles. The
statute provides:
Nor shall any such policy or contract relating to ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle be so issued
or delivered unless it contains an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the

owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle .... 4
In addition to the amount recovered under his father's insurance policy, Bryant was permitted to recover from his own insurer.
The court held that the company was required by statute to pay to
the insured "all sums" which he was legally entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle. That
sum was the unpaid part of his judgment within the limit of the
policy. "To say that he is not entitled to recover anything under
1379 Mich. 562, 153 N.W.2d 655 (1967).
2205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
3 Each policy in the Bryant case had a limit of $10,000 for each person injured.
4 VA. CoDz ANN. § 38.1-581 (b) (Michie 1970) (emphasis supplied).
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this policy because his father had a policy under which he has
received part of the sum he is entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist is to amend the statute, not construe it."'
Many courts, in contrast, have preferred the literal interpretation adopted by the Michigan Court of Appeals in ArminskiP
limiting liability to the amount stated on the face of the policy.
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson 7 adopted such an interpreta-

tion. In that case the petitioner's husband was killed in a collision
with a car driven by the son of the insured, William Thompson.
The car was one of three covered by respondent insurance company's single policy. Since the policy limit on each of the three
cars owned by Thompson for lesion or death of one person was
$10,000, the petitioner felt that the maximum coverage should be
three times that sum. However, the court denied such recovery and
followed the policy language strictly. This provided that "[t]he

limit of bodily injury liability stated in the declarations as applicable to 'each person' [$10,000] is the limit of the company's liability for all damages.., arising out of bodily injury sustained by
one person as the result of any one occurrence . ... "I'

G140 S.E.2d at 820. Virginia has consistently interpreted the uninsured
motorist law liberally. See, e.g., Storm v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 199 Va.
180, 135, 97 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1957): "The legislation having been enacted for
the benefit of the injured parties, it is to be liberally construed so that the
purpose intended may be accomplished."
For other cases allowing recovery on the basis of multiple premiums having been paid, see Smith v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 240 Ore. 167, 400 P.2d 512
(1965); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Robey, 399 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1968);
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966);
Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185, So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966).
Indiana's uninsured motorist insurance statute forbids an insurance carrier to limit the coverage in its policies so as to reduce or eliminate its liability
if "other insurance" is available to the insured, or payments are made pursuant
to other coverage of the policy. The United States District Court, Southern
District of Indiana, concluded that it would be unconscionable to permit insurers to collect a premium for a coverage which they are required by statute
to provide, and then to avoid payment of a loss through language of limiation
devised by themselves. Simpson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
318 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
6178 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970). The court, again relying on the
Horr case, found that the Michigan Supreme Court bad given a literal meaning to the language in the policy in question. "A literal reading of the policy
in the present case limits the defendant's liability to $10,000 coverage for each
person." Id. at 499.
7 56 Wash.2d 715, 355 P.2d 12 (1960).
sId. at 12. Pacific Indemnity is distinguishable from Bryant (supra note
5) in that here the three vehicles were covered by a single policy upon which
a single premium was paid. Many courts, as seen in the cases referred to in
this article, have pyramided the coverage on the theory that the insured paid
multiple premiums.
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In Hilton v. Citizens Insurance Company of New Jersey," the
plaintiffs, husband and wife, owned two automobiles for which
the defendant insurer issued a single automobile liability policy.
While the wife was driving one of the insured vehicles, she was
injured when her car was hit by a truck operated by an uninsured
motorist. The Florida court upheld the $20,000 per accident limit
on the insurer's liability, finding that the policy could not be construed to provide total coverage of $40,000 for each accident.10 It
is notable, however, that the plaintiffs in Hilton sued under a
single automobile liability policy. The court distinguished Sellers
v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.1 on that basis, suggesting that separate liability policies in Hilton would have afford12
ed multiple recovery.
In West Virginia the question of whether multiple premiums
warrant multiple recovery has not yet arisen. Our uninsured motorist statute, which is similar to Virginia's has been in effect since
1967 and provides that "[no] policy or contract [shall] be . . .
issued or delivered unless it shall contain an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be
9201 So. 2d 904 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
10 "To hold with the contention of appellants would amount to rewriting
the clear and unambiguous terms of the insurance policy sued upon and to Impose upon appellee twice the amount of liability it agreed to assume for the
premium charged in exchange for the coverage granted." Id. at 906.
11 185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966).
12As we construe Sellers it held that if a motorist insured under two
or more liability policies containing uninsured motorist coverage suffers damages in excess of the policy limits on any one policy, he can
look to all policies in which he is an insured for recovery of the
total amount of his damages, and that the "other insurance" clause
contained in such policies was held to be void as contrary to the
requirements of the statute.
201 So. 2d at 905.
The Supreme Court of Arizona has taken a compromise view on this
issue in recent rulings on two companion cases. In the first case, an administrator of the estate of an automobile passenger who had been killed in a car accident in which an uninsured motorist was at fault was not entitled to the
cumulative benefits of the uninsured motorist provisions of both decedent's
and the automobile driver's liability policies. In deciding that the "other
insurance" clause of the driver's policy was not contrary to public policy, the
court stated that "the means for providing such extended insurance coverage
lies solely within the province of the Legislature." Transportation Ins. Co. v.
Wade, 475 P.2d 253, 258 (Ariz. 1970).
On the other hand, the court, in the companion case, permitted an insured to recover an additional $7,500 under his uninsured motorist coverage for
injuries sustained in an accident caused solely by the negligence of another
who, because of the four-way splitting of the liability policy, received only
$2,500 for his injuries. The court reasoned that an injured party should be
able to recover the full amount of his damages up to the minimum prescribed
by the Arizona Financial Responsibility Act. Porter v. Empire Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 475 P.2d 258 (Ariz. 1970).
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legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator
of an uninsured motor vehicle .
'..."13
The limits for such coverage
are $10,000 for bodily injury to or death of one person in any one
accident, and $20,000 for two or more persons in a single accident.14
The similarity between West Virginia's statute and Virginia's
would indicate that West Virginia might reach the same conclusion
as Bryant. Moreover, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has ruled with respect to insurance cases that where the language of
a policy is equivocal and susceptible to more than one construction,
it is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly
against the insurer.' 5
Finally, an indication that West Virginia will construe any
liability-limiting clause liberally appears in Collins v. New York
Casuality Co.:'6
Because the purpose of an omnibus clause in an automobile public liability insurance policy is not to limit the
insurer's liability, but to provide additional coverage, the
clause is designed to protect not only those entrusted with
the use of the automobile, but the public in general, and
therefore the provisions of the clause should be liberally
applied to effectuate the
purpose for which it was incor7
porated in the policy.'
Public policy would dictate that the more liberal view is to be
preferred, for it is certainly the more propitious for those whom
liability insurance is intended to protect-the public in general.
Indeed, it would smack of apostasy to allow insurers to collect a
premium for a coverage which they are required by statute to
provide, and then to avoid payment of a loss because of liabilitylimiting language of their own contrivance.
W. Taylor Boone, Jr.

VA. CODE ch. 33, art. 6, § 31(b) (Michie Supp. 1970).
VA. CODE ch. 17D, art. 4, § 2 (Michie 1966).
'5 Green v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 139 W. Va. 475, 80 S.E.2d
424 (1954); Farley v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 137 W. Va. 455, 72 S.E.2d 520
(1952); Davis v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 137 W. Va. 196, 70 S.E.2d 814
(1952); Adkins v. Kentucky Cent. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 131 W. Va. 638,
48 S.E.2d 436 (1948).
1sW.
14 W.

-6140 W. Va. 1, 82 S.E.2d 288 (1954).
27 Id. at 12, 82 S.F-2d at 295 (emphasis supplied).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1971

5

